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We estimate impacts of male job loss, female job loss, and male unemployment
benefits on domestic violence in Brazil. We merge employer-employee and social wel-
fare registers with administrative data on domestic violence cases brought to criminal
courts, use of public shelters by victims and mandatory notifications of domestic vio-
lence by health providers. Leveraging mass layoffs for identification, we find that both
male and female job loss, independently, lead to large and pervasive increases in do-
mestic violence. Exploiting a discontinuity in unemployment insurance eligibility, we
find that eligible men are not less likely to commit domestic violence while benefits are
being paid, and more likely to commit it once benefits expire. Our findings are consis-
tent with job loss increasing domestic violence on account of a negative income shock
and an increase in exposure of victims to perpetrators, with unemployment benefits
partially offsetting the income shock while reinforcing the exposure shock.
Keywords: domestic violence, unemployment, mass layoffs, unemployment insurance,
income shock, exposure, Brazil
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1 Introduction
As many as one in three women report having ever experienced domestic violence
(DV) at some stage in their lives (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2006), which makes DV one
of the most widespread violations of human rights. It is both a marker and a cause of
gender inequality in the economic domain and, yet, it has attracted far less attention
from economists than other dimensions of gender discrimination such as the gender
pay gap. One reason for relatively limited causal research on DV is that large-scale
systematic data on DV are scarce.
In this paper, we study how economic shocks and policies influence DV, exploiting
administrative data on the universe of DV cases brought to Brazilian courts in 2009-
2018, a total of about 2.4 million cases. We link these data to longitudinal employer-
employee registers containing a total of 100 million workers and 60 million yearly
employment spells. We complement the analysis with additional DV measures based
on the use of DV public shelters and mandatory DV reports by health providers;
and information on couples for a subset of our main dataset. We address two main
questions. First, we estimate dynamic treatment effects of male job loss on DV
perpetration and of female job loss on DV victimization, leveraging mass layoffs for
identification. Second, we examine whether unemployment insurance (UI) attenuates
any effects of job loss, leveraging plausibly exogenous variation in UI eligibility in a
clean regression discontinuity (RD) design.
Estimating the impacts of male job loss, female job loss, and unemployment bene-
fits in the same setting places us in a good position to examine potential mechanisms.
In particular, we focus on two main mechanisms. First, the negative income shock
brought by job loss may trigger stress and re-negotiation of a shrunken household
budget, opening the door for conflict (Clark et al., 2008; Buller et al., 2018)1. Sec-
ond, job loss constitutes a positive time shock, increasing women’s exposure to DV
risk as displaced workers spend more time at home (Dugan, Nagin and Rosenfeld,
2003). This mechanism may be particularly relevant during the stressful period fol-
lowing job loss. An association of exposure with DV is suggested by evidence that DV
escalates during national holidays, weekends and nights, when families spend more
time together (Vazquez, Stohr and Purkiss, 2005).
1Clark et al. (2008) show that, among a range of negative shocks including bereavement and
divorce, job loss stands out as causing persistent unhappiness. The idea that stress may lead to DV
is also in line with the evidence in Card and Dahl (2011).
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Both the income and time shock mechanisms predict an increase in DV following
job loss. This is what we find: male and female job loss each, independently, lead
to a sharp and persistent increase in DV. In particular, male job loss leads to a 32%
increase in the risk of perpetration, and female job loss to a 56% increase in the risk of
victimization.2 These effects are pervasive along the distribution of perpetrator age,
education and baseline income, and also across area-level characteristics including
baseline DV rates, the gender pay gap, population size, GDP per capita, and the labor
informality rate. They are evident among first-time as well as repeat perpetrators
(and victims). These patterns line up with persistent employment and labor income
losses following male and female job loss, which we also document.
Within this framework, unemployment benefits constitute a positive shock to
income and a positive shock to time. In particular, benefits lead to greater DV
exposure by reducing labor supply and lengthening unemployment duration (Katz and
Meyer, 1990; Card, Chetty and Weber, 2007; Lalive, 2008). While the income effects
of benefits will tend to reduce DV by mitigating the income drop brought by job loss,
this may be counter-balanced by increased exposure to DV. As a result, the overall
impact of unemployment benefits on DV will depend upon the relative size of the
income and exposure effects. We find that unemployment benefits have no impact on
DV while they are being paid out, and a perverse impact, increasing DV, once benefits
expire. These findings are consistent with the income shock offsetting higher exposure
as long as benefits are being received, and with the exposure mechanism prevailing
after benefits cease.3 Supporting evidence of the role of cash at displacement is
garnered by leveraging the fact that mandatory severance pay is increasing in tenure,
and showing that job loss has no effect on DV for high tenure workers.4 Summarizing,
2Our main estimates for male and female job loss are based on somewhat different samples due
to data constraints explained in Section 3. We formally test for differences in magnitudes between
these estimates, using a homogeneous samples across geographical areas, and cannot reject effects
of the same magnitude. To place the effect size in perspective, consider that Angelucci (2008) finds
that cash transfers to women amounting to a 35% increase in household income reduce aggressive
behavior by 21%; Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) and Brassiolo (2016) find roughly a 30% decline in
DV rates after introduction of unilateral divorce in the US and Spain respectively.
3The fact that the UI income effects fade once benefits cease is in line with evidence that unem-
ployed workers appear not to smooth their consumption, and exhibit large consumption drops upon
benefit expiration. See Ganong and Noel (2019); Gerard and Naritomi (2021).
4This pattern is robust to including flexible controls accounting for differences in the impacts of
job loss on DV by age, income and education. The tenure coefficients exhibit limited sensitivity to
these controls, making it less likely that unobservables correlated with tenure drive the pattern. We
show that it is not the case that employment recovers more readily for high tenure workers, which
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our results suggest that job loss increases the risk of DV, and this risk is not attenuated
by unemployment benefits; in fact, benefits increase the risk of DV after benefit
expiration on account of lengthening unemployment duration.
We address challenges to the causal interpretation of these results. A first order
challenge is endogenous reporting. It seems plausible that women are less likely to
report DV when they lose their jobs, but more likely to report it when the man loses
his job. If this were the case, our estimates of the impact of male job loss would
be upward biased, while the estimated impact of female job loss would be downward
biased. We address this concern by showing that our estimates hold using court cases
initiated by in flagrante arrests (i.e., when the offender is caught “red-handed”). We
also show that the results hold for use of public shelters by women, and mandatory
notifications of DV cases by public and private health providers. These measures
depend less (if at all) on the victim’s discretion in reporting. In the case of public
shelter use and notifications by health providers, the police and judicial authorities
are not notified, which mitigates concerns of reporting being inhibited by the fear of
retaliation by male offenders.5 In addition, in flagrante arrests and health provider
notifications of DV are not subject to time lags between the date of DV and its
prosecution, allowing us to measure more precisely the timing of violence and to
better inspect pre-trends.
Another key challenge to identification is dynamic selection into job loss. We
show that our estimates remain virtually identical when varying the definition of
mass layoffs to the limiting case of plant closures, and when adopting an intention-to-
treat approach that defines as treated all workers in mass layoff firms (including the
non-displaced) so to avoid any potential selection into job loss, even within plausibly
exogenous mass layoffs. Our baseline empirical strategy compares the probability of
DV between workers displaced in mass layoffs and non-displaced workers that are
exactly matched on a wide array of observable worker, firm and area characteristics.
We show that the estimates are also robust to including fine-grained fixed effects for
the interaction of municipality, 2-digit industry, and time fixed-effects which demon-
strates that the control group defined via exact matching flexibly captures local and
industry-specific shocks.
makes it unlikely that differences in exposure explain the observed patterns. Thus the evidence
points to liquidity differences.
5We also exploit information on the severity of DV offenses, as higher willingness to report should
result in less severe offenses being reported more often at the margin.
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To support our analysis of UI eligibility, we provide extensive evidence that dis-
placed workers are as-good-as-randomly assigned near the RD cutoff, and that the
discontinuity estimates are robust to varying bandwidths, polynomial specifications,
permutation tests and falsification analysis based on pre-displacement DV suits.
We investigate a number of other concerns, including missing information on the
identity of suspected offenders and victims; flows of displaced workers into the in-
formal economy; and estimation issues arising in staggered difference-in-differences
models (discussed, among others, by Goodman-Bacon, 2021; de Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfœuille, 2020). In our main analysis sample, we study male and female job
loss in isolation. However we show that our main results hold in a subsample where
we can link couples.6 Using this sample, we also show that the chances of couple
separation are not strongly affected by male or female job loss.
Our approach marks a sharp departure from existing research on DV which has
primarily focused on relative, potential income, and where the modal theme has been
the empowerment of women. We provide the first estimates of impacts of individ-
ual job loss by men and women on DV, and the first estimates of the potential for
unemployment benefits to mitigate such effects. In doing this, we shift the focus to
absolute, realized income shocks, and we additionally highlight the relevance of dis-
posable time. In addition, we investigate reporting bias more carefully than many
existing studies of DV.
Our finding that job loss of men and women leads to higher DV cannot be ex-
plained by existing theoretical constructs in the DV literature, which predict opposite
signs on male and female unemployment rates. In the household bargaining model,
bargaining power is determined by outside options, and DV is increasing in the relative
power of the man and decreasing in the relative power of the woman. Investigating
movements in area-level unemployment rates in the UK, (Anderberg et al., 2016) finds
evidence consistent with this- increases in male unemployment rates lower DV, while
increases in female rates increase it. Similarly, Aizer (2010) finds that improvements
in area-level relative wages of women in the United States lower DV. An alterna-
tive construct, the male backlash model (Macmillan and Gartner, 1999) generates
the reverse predictions on the premise that female employment primes male (bread-
winner) identity and that this triggers violence. Consistent with this, a number of
6Namely, we show that women are more likely to suffer DV when their male partner loses his
job, and that men are more likely to be prosecuted for DV when their female partner loses her job.
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studies reveal an increase in DV following improvements in labor market opportu-
nities for women (Tur-Prats, 2019; Bhalotra et al., 2019; Erten and Keskin, 2020).
Other hypotheses broadly consistent with such patterns are the instrumental control
and sabotage models, whereby men commit violence to extract resources from women
or sabotage their careers, respectively (Bloch and Rao, 2002; Anderberg and Rainer,
2013).
Our results are not directly comparable because we analyze a different shock,
which is actual job loss. Area-level unemployment shocks capture a weighted average
of impacts on a relatively small share of workers who actually lose their jobs, and
a large share of workers who do not. However, it is only when individuals actually
lose their jobs that they experience a loss of earnings and an increase in disposable
time – the key mechanisms that explain our findings. The mechanisms highlighted
in existing research, related to outside opportunities modifying relative power within
couples, may play a second-order role in our setting, possibly influencing the rela-
tive magnitudes of the impact of male and female job loss on DV, but they cannot
explain the first-order patterns. Moreover, estimates based on area-level shocks may
be contaminated by correlated area-level factors such as public spending on social
programs, health care, and law enforcement. Our empirical exercise controls for all
such factors by comparing job losers (in mass layoffs) to similar workers, employed in
the same industry and area, who face similar area-level conditions.
Outside the cited analyses of regional unemployment rates, the DV literature
overwhelmingly focuses on interventions designed to empower women, through cash
transfers, microcredit, skills training, or job assignment (Angelucci, 2008; Bobonis,
Gonzalez-Brenes and Castro, 2013; Hidrobo and Fernald, 2013; Luke and Munshi,
2011; Heath, 2014; Kotsadam and Villanger, 2020). We draw attention to the im-
portance of shocks to total household income, and depart from the exclusive focus
on women by considering also economic shocks to men. Another recent study that
considers economic shocks to men and women is Haushofer et al. (2019), who analyse
one time cash transfers to women and men in Kenya in a controlled experiment.7
7Consistent with our findings, they find a reduction in DV in both cases. The job loss shock
differs from their cash transfer experiment in several aspects. First, job loss causes a negative
income shock and this can have different impacts from a positive cash transfer due to loss aversion
or liquidity constraints; second, job loss may lower self-esteem which can compound income-related
stress; third, job loss generates a direct time shock; and, fourth, it is arguably a more widespread
routine phenomenon of general interest than income windfalls through one time cash transfers.
Unemployment benefits are also not comparable to cash transfers to the extent that they lengthen
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Our findings are consistent with and also contribute to a literature documenting
the often dramatic impacts of individual job loss on people’s lives. The mechanisms
we highlight are in line with studies showing that job loss results in mental health
problems (Kuhn, Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009; Charles and DeCicca, 2008; Zimmer,
2021; Zimmerman, 2006), substance abuse (Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2015),
premature mortality (Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009) and divorce (Charles and
Stephens, 2004; Eliason, 2012).8
Two studies analyzing crime more generally are related to ours, while differing in
important dimensions. Britto, Pinotti and Sampaio (2020) investigate the impact of
job loss and unemployment benefits for men on crimes other than DV employing the
judicial data used in this paper. Rose (2018) provides a similar analysis, including
DV among other crimes but using a sample of ex-inmates in the state of Washington,
in contrast to which we use data on the universe of displaced workers from a large and
heterogeneous country. Unlike most other crimes, DV emerges within the household
where incomes are often shared and negotiated, and cohabitation increases exposure.
The interdependence of the couple leads to reporting bias being a much more severe
concern for DV than for other types of crime, for which reason we complement the
analysis of judicial suits with several alternative DV measures which give us confidence
that our key finding that male and female job loss both increase DV levels is not
simply an artifact of higher reporting. Other important differences are that the crime
literature focuses on perpetration while we additionally study impacts of female job
loss on DV victimization, and that we investigate the specific mechanisms driving DV,
demonstrating that existing theoretical constructs in the DV domain cannot explain
impacts of individual job loss. We uncover an additional pattern which underlines
that DV is driven by different mechanisms which is that UI eligibility does not lead
to lower DV, in contrast to the case for other crimes (Britto, Pinotti and Sampaio,
2020; Rose, 2018).
Overall, we demonstrate the pernicious impact of job loss, whether suffered by
men or women, on domestic violence. Our estimates suggest that unemployment
benefits can mitigate if accompanied by policies that mandate or incentivize a return
to work. Understanding the mechanisms at play and identifying mitigating policies is
unemployment duration by directly incentivizing lower job search.
8In turn, stress (Card and Dahl, 2011) and substance abuse (Lee Luca, Owens and Sharma, 2019)
have been linked to DV.
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important given the substantial economic costs that DV imposes on women (Bindler
and Ketel, 2020; Peterson et al., 2018) and children (Aizer, 2011; Doyle Jr. and Aizer,
2018; Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents results for male and
female job loss, and Section 5 investigates mitigation with unemployment benefits.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Context and Institutions
Domestic violence and criminal justice in Brazil. The Gender, Institutions
and Development report (OECD, 2019) documents that one third of women in Brazil
are subject to violence during their lifetime. The “Central do Atendimento a Mulher
- Ligue 180 ”, a contact line instituted in 2003 by the Ministry of Women, Family
and Human Rights, attended 1.4 million requests for help in 2019, leading to 85,000
judicial investigations.
Domestic violence is a criminal offence that falls under the jurisdiction of 27 state
courts, composed of a total of 2,697 tribunals having jurisdiction over one or more of
Brazil’s 5,570 municipalities. The state judiciary police handles DV investigations,
usually initiated by a victim report, though it may also follow from third party re-
porting without the victim’s consent. Following the investigation, the victim decides
whether or not to file for DV prosecution, which would then lead to a trial. Impor-
tantly, the data we analyze include all reported cases, because the decision to drop
the case needs to be overseen by a judge. In addition to reporting DV, women who
feel threatened may file a separate request for protective measures (PM), introduced
in 2006 by the Maria da Penha Law. PMs run in courts as a distinct legal instrument
independent from the DV prosecution and they must be seen by a judge within 48
hours, in which case perpetrators may immediately receive a restraining order.
Labor markets. Labor law in Brazil allows firms to dismiss workers without a just
cause, although it imposes severance payments. As many as 93% of all contracts in the
private sector are open-ended, full-time contracts. We analyze layoffs without a just
cause, which account for 65% of all separations (the rest are mainly voluntary quits).
All workers are entitled to a mandatory savings account financed by the employer
through monthly contributions equivalent to 8% of the worker’s earnings. Only when
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dismissed without just cause, workers can access these funds and are further entitled
to a severance payment equivalent to 40% of the account’s balance.9 Summing over
these two sources, workers receive approximately 1.34 monthly wages for each year of
tenure at the time of layoff.
Workers in the formal sector that are dismissed without a just cause may be el-
igible for unemployment insurance. There are two main conditions for eligibility:
first, at least six months of continuous employment; second, at least 16 months be-
tween layoff dates for subsequent UI claims. Unemployment benefits last three to
five months, with a replacement rate of 100% for workers earning the minimum wage,
which decreases smoothly to 67% at the benefit cap (2.65 times the minimum wage).10
Once unemployment benefits expire, the only income support at the national level
is “Bolsa Famı́lia”, a conditional means-tested cash transfer targeted at very poor
families. In 2019, the average transfer per household was 16% of the minimum wage
and the maximum per capita family income for eligibility was less than one-fifth of
the minimum wage.
Our description so far refers to formal jobs. However, Brazil has a large informal
sector, accounting for roughly 45% of all jobs in the analysis period. Job turnover is
high in both the formal and informal sector, workers tend to move frequently between
the two and it is not uncommon that firms hire both formal and informal workers
(Ulyssea, 2018). Since there are no administrative data on informal employment,
we restrict our main analysis to layoffs in the formal sector. We use survey data
to quantify the degree to which informal sector work contributes to the recovery of
employment and earnings after job loss, and show that it is relatively small. In any
case, failing to account for transitions of displaced workers to the informal sector
implies that we under-estimate the elasticity of DV to labor income upon job loss.
Preliminary evidence. Figure 1 plots the adult employment rate and the female
homicide rate, the best available indicator for DV over long periods, for 1990-2018.
Feminicide rates increased substantially from 3 homicides per 100k women in 1990
to 4.3 in 2018. Notably, this increase coincides with a worsening in labor market
conditions during the period. Of course, these patterns in aggregate data may reflect
9A few exceptional cases allow workers to withdraw from the account prior to displacement –
e.g., severe illness or when buying their first house.
10The duration of unemployment benefits depends on the number of months worked in the three
years before dismissal:(6-11, 12-23 and 24+ months of work allow for up to 3, 4 and 5 months of
benefits, respectively.
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trends in other omitted factors. We next describe the detailed individual-level data
that we will use to identify causal effects.
3 Data
The main analysis relies on individual, longitudinal data derived by linking court and
employment registers. We describe each data source and, then, the linking procedure.
Judicial registers. We use the universe of DV cases filed in all first-degree courts
during 2009-18. These include information on the start and end date of the judicial
case, court location, subjects being discussed, and full names of the defendant and
plaintiff.11 In total, there are 2.4 million DV cases (11% of all criminal prosecutions),
comprising 1.23 million DV prosecutions and 1.17 million protective measures. The
name of the defendant is available for 1 million of the 2.4 million DV cases. When
focusing on victims, we only use data on protective measures, for which we observe the
plaintiff name in 244,000 out of 1.17 million cases, while plaintiff names are missing
in virtually all DV prosecutions. Missingness arises for two reasons that we cannot
distinguish in the data: imprecision in the process of inputting data from court diaries;
and judicial secrecy, which tends to protect the victim’s identity.
Missing data challenge identification only if they are related to the job status
of the defendant or the plaintiff. We argue that this is unlikely to be the case, for
at least three reasons. First, requests for secrecy are typically made after the case
has started, and we are able to capture the identity of the defendant as long as the
case is started without secrecy. Second, the threat of dismissal is not a valid legal
motive for invoking secrecy. Finally, the share of missing names varies considerably
across jurisdictions, indicating that a large portion of the variation is driven by court-
specific factors. In the main analysis, we drop areas where the share of missing names
is greater than 90%. In Section 4.4, we provide several robustness tests showing that
our findings are robust to the potential bias arising from missing names in several
ways. Specifically, we show our main estimates remain similar when restricting the
sample to jurisdictions where the share of missing names is quantitatively irrelevant;
and we show that using alternative measures of DV which do not suffer from missing
11We obtained these data from Kurier, a private company providing information services to law
firms in Brazil. The dataset is compiled from case-level information made publicly available on
tribunal websites, complemented with daily diaries of courts.
10
data limitations lead to similar patterns as in the main analysis – namely, public
shelter use and DV notifications by health providers.
Employment registers. We use linked employer-employee data for 2009-2018 cov-
ering the universe of formal workers and firms in Brazil (RAIS), made available by
the Ministry of Labor. Workers are identified by a unique tax code identifier (CPF)
and their full name. Since employers must provide workers with notice of dismissal
at least 30 days in advance – each completed year of tenure extending notice by 3
days –, we define the timing of layoff as the official layoff date stated in RAIS minus
30 days. This is a conservative choice when testing the parallel trends assumption
underlying our identification strategy. In practice, more than a third of workers in
our sample were dismissed within a year of employment, thus with a notice period
of 30 days, and 90% were dismissed with less than three years in their last job, thus
with a notice period of 30-39 days.
Linking court and employment records. We merge the judicial and employ-
ment data using the (full) name of the individual, which is consistently and accu-
rately reported in both registers. We restrict our sample to individuals with unique
names in the country – about half of the adult population. We identify this sub-
population by using the employment records and the register for Federal social pro-
grams (CadUnico), which together provide the name and tax identifier for 96% of
the adult population. To assess selection into the estimation sample, we compare
characteristics of male and female job losers with and without unique names. The
two groups are very similar in all (observable) dimension, the standardized difference
remaining below 0.25 for all variables (see Appendix Table A1). In any event, we will
assess the sensitivity of our results by retaining all individuals with a unique name
within the state (rather than the country), which extends coverage to 70% of the
population.
Household, public shelter and health systems data Although we cannot link
couples or families in our main panel covering employment and judicial records, we
are able to do so for a subsample of our data. Specifically, we use data on household
composition from CadUnico – a restricted access social registry maintained by the
Federal government for administering welfare programs such as Bolsa Familia. Due
to the nature of the social registry, it overlaps with the lower part of the income
distribution in our main panel. To validate our main results, we will also use data
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on access to DV public shelters by women and mandatory DV notifications by health
providers as alternative measures for domestic violence (see Section 4.4).
4 Job Loss and Domestic Violence
4.1 Descriptive evidence
The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the probability of DV perpetration (men) and
victimization (women) in our sample by employment status and age. DV risk peaks
around age 30-35, and declines thereafter. The probabilities of both perpetration
and victimization are higher among displaced workers than among employed workers.
Of course, the difference between the two groups may reflect both causal effects and
selection into job loss; in the remainder of this section, we aim to isolate the former
from the latter. The graphs in the lower panel of Figure 2 show that the probability
of DV upon job loss is decreasing in job tenure, an association that we will investigate
further. These graphs also illustrate the very high turnover rate in the Brazilian labor
market.
4.2 Identification strategy
We use a difference-in-differences strategy where we define as treated all workers dis-
placed in mass layoffs between 2012 and 2014 – the central years within our sample
period, 2009-2018. Therefore, we estimate dynamic treatment effects for up to four
years after displacement, and anticipation effects up to three years before displace-
ment, using a perfectly balanced panel.
The pool of potential control workers includes all individuals employed in firms
that did not engage in mass layoffs during the analysis period. We leverage the vast-
ness of the data to identify control workers who are not displaced in the same calendar
year and are exactly matched on birth cohort, job tenure (by year), earnings cate-
gory (by R$250/month bins), firm size (quartiles), one-digit industrial sector (9), and
state (27). In cases where a treated worker is matched with multiple controls, one is
randomly selected. We investigate the sensitivity of the results to redefining matched
controls as workers who are continuously employed through the entire post-treatment
period.12 Over 80% of displaced workers are successfully matched to a control, who
12Previous papers have used both approaches. For instance, Ichino et al. (2017) and Schmieder,
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receives a placebo dismissal date equal to the layoff date of the matched treated
worker. We compare outcomes between treated and control workers, respectively,
using the following difference-in-differences equation:
Yit = α + γTreati +
T∑
t=−P,t6=0
δt(Treati ∗ Timet) +
T∑
t=−P,t6=0
Timet + εit. (1)
Workers are identified by subscript i, and Treati is an indicator for being displaced
in a mass layoff. Dummy variables Timet identify years since layoff. Time units
are defined precisely using the exact date of layoffs and DV prosecutions or PM.
Therefore, t = 0 for the 12 months before layoff, t = 1 for the first 12 months
after layoff, t = −1 for the 12 months preceding the year before layoff, and so on;
the coefficients {δ1, ..., δT} identify dynamic treatment effects, whereas {δ−P , ..., δ−1}
estimate anticipation effects. Time-varying shocks are absorbed by including a full
set of period fixed effects, Timet. The inclusion of (a large share of) never-treated
workers as controls addresses concerns regarding the estimation of two-way fixed-
effects models with staggered treatment across units (we will show the diagnostics
recommended by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille, 2020).
To summarize the magnitude of the effects following job loss, we also estimate the
equation
Yit = α + γTreati + β(Treati ∗ Postt) + λPostt + εit, (2)
where the dummy Postt identifies the entire period after layoff, and all other variables
are defined as in equation (1).
Although the difference-in-differences design does not strictly require the treat-
ment and control groups to be the same in levels, Table 1 shows that treated and
(matched) control workers are fairly balanced on observable characteristics. The stan-
dardized difference between the two groups is below the threshold of 0.25 for almost
all variables (including several attributes not used for matching such as race, occupa-
tion, municipality characteristics and the probability of DV in the pre-displacement
period), the only exception being education in the male worker sample.
The main challenge to identification is dynamic selection into displacement. Paral-
lel trends between treated and control workers in the pre-treatment period attenuate
von Wachter and Bender (2018) define the control group similarly to our baseline setting, while
Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) and Couch and Placzek (2010) restrict controls to be workers
who are continuously employed throughout the period.
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but do not fully address this concern, as idiosyncratic, time-varying shocks causing
higher DV and layoff risks in a given year may not be revealed in differential pre-
trends. Our focus on mass layoffs minimizes such concern, as mass-layoffs depend
on firm-level shocks rather than on the behavior of displaced workers (see e.g. Gath-
mann, Helm and Schönberg, 2020). Our baseline definition of mass layoffs includes
firms with 30 or more workers dismissing at least 33% of their workforce without just
cause in a given a year.13 We extensively assess the sensitivity of results to changes in
the definition of mass layoffs and to other robustness tests for selection (see Section
4.5).
4.3 Dynamic treatment effects of male and female job loss
We first discuss the effects of job loss on labor market careers. Figure 3 plots the
estimated effects of male and female job loss in a mass layoff on labor income using the
specification in equation (1). All estimates in the paper are re-scaled by the average
outcome level in the treatment group in the year before layoff. In the first year after
male layoff, labor income is 70% lower than the baseline level before layoff. Starting
in the second year after layoff, there is a continuous but slow recovery, with labor
income four years after layoff being still 36% lower for treated workers compared to
controls. The estimates are remarkably similar for women, as shown in the right panel
of Figure 3. In Appendix B.1, we show that job loss also has an adverse and persistent
impact on employment, monthly wages, and job turnover. In Appendix B.2, we use
survey data to show that the impact of job loss on income is about 10% smaller when
we account for informal sector income of displaced workers. Therefore, our estimates
of elasticities of DV to formal sector income will (slightly) underestimate elasticities
to total income.
We next examine how male job loss influences domestic violence, as measured by
either DV prosecutions or protective measures. As shown by the left graph in Figure
4, layoff leads to a sharp increase in the probability of domestic violence in the year
following job loss, which persists through the following years. The average effect over
the post-treatment amounts to a 32% increase in the probability of DV relative to
the baseline rate (Panel A of Table 2, column 3). When distinguishing between DV
13This definition is similar to Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) and Couch and Placzek
(2010). We also exclude firms reallocating under a new identifier, where reallocation is defined as at
least 50% of workers displaced from a firm being found in a new firm by the start of the following
year.
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prosecutions and protective measures, the effect is +40% on the former and +30% on
the latter (columns 4-5).
Turning to DV victimization, the right graph in Figure 4 shows that female job
loss sharply increases victimization in the year following layoff, and that this effect
persists for at least four years. The average effect indicates a 56% increase over the
baseline (Panel B in Table 2, column 5). The relative effect is larger than the effect
of male job loss (30%), although the samples are not based on exactly the same
jurisdictions and the female job loss estimates are less precise, being estimated on a
smaller sample (see Section 3). In Appendix B.3, we show that the coefficients are
similar if we estimate both effects on the same, smaller sample (we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that they are equal with a p-value of 0.45).
In Appendix B.4, we investigate the fact that the job loss effect on DV remains
positive and sizable several years after the layoff. Although recurrent offences partially
explain persistence – a fourth of all perpetrators are charged more than once over the
ten year period covered by our sample – we also observe a sustained job loss effect
on the probability of first offenses following both male and female layoffs. This is
important because once initiated DV tends to persist within couples. The observed
patterns are consistent with the sustained labor market losses following displacement.
4.4 Reporting bias
There is widespread under-reporting of DV on account of gendered norms, social
stigma, concern for children, and the economic interdependence of the couple. In
particular, if a woman is financially dependent on her partner, she might be more
likely to report him for DV once he loses his job, in which case our estimates of
impacts of male job loss on DV prosecutions will be upward biased. However if a
woman is less likely to report violence once she loses her job, this will lead to our
estimates of the effect of female job loss on DV victimization being downward biased.
We assess whether reporting bias drives our estimates for male job loss in two
ways. First, we exploit variation in the intensity of violence, measured by the type of
DV reported and jail time sentence. A higher willingness to report should result in
less severe offenses being reported more often at the margin, so male job loss should
have a stronger effect on less severe DV cases. On the contrary, Figure 5 shows that
male job loss leads to larger increases in DV offenses leading to longer jail times (left
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graph), and that the effect is pervasive for all types of DV cases (right graph).14
Our second strategy is to replicate the analysis using alternative measures of DV
that depend less, if at all, on discretion in reporting because they are reported by
third parties. First we analyse DV cases initiated “in flagrante” by police officers,
possibly called by a third party (e.g., a neighbor or a bystander on the street). These
circumstances attenuate the risk of reporting bias. The estimated effect of job loss on
this restricted subset of cases is virtually identical to the baseline estimate including
all DV cases (see Figure B4 in Appendix B.5.A). Second, we study women’s use of
public shelters for DV victims, available from the social welfare register for 2011-2013.
This is less prone to reporting bias because, unlike judicial prosecutions, it does not
directly implicate the male partner. Table B2 in Appendix B.5.A shows that male
and female job loss increase the use of DV shelters by the female partner by 24% and
46%, respectively.
We use a third measure of DV drawn from mandatory reports by the health system,
available for 2010-2017. All public and private health units in Brazil must file a DV
notification in the Sistema de Informação de Agravos de Notificação (SINAN) system
when they suspect or know that their patients are victims of domestic violence. This
generates an ideal measure of DV incidents, as the information is mandatory, reported
by a third party, and includes both mild and severe cases (in contrast to DV-related
hospitalization which include only more severe cases-a measure previously used in the
DV literature, e.g. by Aizer, 2010). Moreover, these notifications remain within the
health system (i.e., they are not sent to the police or judicial authorities) so fear of
retaliation from offenders should be a lesser concern.
One complication with the health notifications data is that they do not provide
individual identifiers. In Appendix B.5.B, we describe the data linkage procedure we
use to match DV notifications to data on job losers and matched control workers on
(clusters of) exact birth date, municipality, and gender. Since this procedure neces-
sarily entails some degree of measurement error, we extend the mass layoff sample to
workers displaced in the period 2012-16, thus tracking SINAN reports for only two
years before and after job loss, in order to increase statistical power. Importantly,
we validate our data linkage procedure by replicating the estimation of employment
14In the left graph of Figure 5, we distinguish between jail time sentences of up to 3 years vs. 4
or more years, respectively, because the Brazilian legislation classifies the former as mild crimes and
the latter as ordinary crimes.
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effects of job loss. In other words, we use the same procedure to match employment
outcomes, as if we did not have unique individual identifiers. The results are virtually
identical to the baseline employment estimates obtained with linkage based on unique
individual identifiers (see Appendix Figure B5).
The results for DV notifications are presented in Figure 6. They confirm our main
finding that both male and female job loss lead to an increase in DV. Appendix Ta-
ble B3 shows that these results are robust to using different maximum cluster sizes
(columns 1-3); interacted municipality, time and birth period fixed-effects (columns
4-5); and more stringent mass layoffs definitions (columns 6-7). The relative effect on
DV is larger than the baseline estimate, though computing baseline rates is compli-
cated because the matching procedure does not uniquely identify individuals.15
Overall, results using three alternative DV measures that are less subject to re-
porting bias confirm that our baseline estimates based on legal prosecutions capture
actual increases in DV upon job loss, as opposed to changes in reporting behavior.
4.5 Robustness
In Appendix B.6, we assess the sensitivity of our baseline estimates to additional ro-
bustness checks. First, estimates using quarterly data provide further support for the
hypothesis of common pre-trends (Appendix B.6.A).16 Second, results are robust to
the inclusion of fine grained municipality-industry-year fixed effects, indicating that
using individual matched controls finely absorbs area level shocks; and the results are
similar when extending the sample coverage to workers with a unique name in the
state of work rather than in the entire country (Appendix B.6.B). Third, we address
potential selection within mass layoffs by showing that the results remain robust
when using stricter mass layoff definitions and plant closures. We also implement
an intention-to-treat approach that addresses selection by considering as treated all
workers in mass layoff firms, i.e. both displaced and non-displaced (Appendix B.6.C).
15Taking the mean over the outcome in the estimation sample would inflate baseline rates as it
would include DV notifications for several individuals. For this reason, we compute the mean for
the 13% of workers who are uniquely identified by the characteristics we use to merge the SINAN
data.
16The results for alternative measures of DV discussed in previous Section 4.4 – namely, “in
flagrante” cases, DV shelters, and SINAN reports – also allow for a better inspection of pre-trends
than the baseline measure based on DV suits, as the former are immediately filed in courts, thus
avoiding any lag between the date of violence and judicial prosecutions. The same is true for
protective measures, which we use in our baseline estimates of the effect of female job loss on
victimization (see Section 3).
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Fourth, our results are essentially unaffected when progressively restricting the data
to jurisdictions with a smaller share of missing names in the court data. In fact, our
findings remain robust even when focusing exclusively on jurisdictions where such
issues are not quantitatively relevant (Appendix B.6.D). Finally, we deal with the
identification issues arising in two-way fixed-effects models with staggered treatment
(see,e.g., Goodman-Bacon, 2021; de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille, 2020). On ac-
count of the inclusion of a large share of “pure controls” not experiencing mass layoffs
in the entire period over which they are matched to a treated worker, our difference-in-
differences coefficient averages heterogeneous treatment effects with positive weights
for all cross-sectional units (Appendix B.6.E).
So far, we have studied in isolation the effects of male and female job loss on
domestic violence. Not all DV cases refer to domestic violence within couples- they
may include cases between non-cohabiting couples, ex-partners, and non-partners. In
Appendix B.7, we show that our main findings hold within couples in the subsample
of workers present in the welfare register, CadUnico, as this allows us to identify
cohabiting partners. This is relevant as theoretical models of DV are conceptualized
for couples. We also show that male job loss does not influence the probability
that the couple stays together, while female job loss has a small impact. We report
heterogeneous effects by baseline household characteristics. While the sub-group
coefficients are not significantly different from one another, the results are broadly in
line with the mechanisms we propose.
4.6 Mechanisms and relation to previous work
Before we move on to consider mechanisms and potential policy approaches, we pause
here to take stock of how the results so far relate to the existing literature. The esti-
mated effects of male and female job loss in Table 2 cannot be explained by common
theoretical constructs in the DV literature. The household bargaining model predicts
that male job loss decreases male bargaining power leading to lower DV, but we find
higher DV (though our results are in line with predictions of the bargaining model
for female job loss). The male backlash, instrumental control and sabotage models
referenced earlier both predict that female job loss leads to lower DV, but we find
that it leads to higher DV. These models do not incorporate the mechanisms that
we propose as the drivers of our findings, namely the stress of a substantial income
shock, and increased exposure (or opportunities for crime) at a stressful time. Our
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results are not directly comparable to results from studies testing these models using
area level unemployment or wage shocks on DV, which tend to find opposite effects
of male and female labor market conditions on domestic violence (Anderberg et al.,
2016; Aizer, 2010; Tur-Prats, 2019; Bhalotra et al., 2019; Erten and Keskin, 2020).
The reason is that variations in area-level unemployment rates represent a change in
the risk of unemployment for most people, with only a small share of individuals ac-
tually being displaced. In contrast, we estimate the impact of realized unemployment
shocks, while controlling for local labor market conditions. We compare job losers to
similar (matched) workers in the same local labor market, and we control flexibly for
shocks at the municipality-industry-year level. Importantly, the income and exposure
mechanisms that we suggest drive our results are only triggered upon actual job loss.
4.7 Heterogeneity by Worker and Area Characteristics
We now investigate how impacts of job loss on DV vary by worker characteristics,
namely age, education, income and tenure. We focus on male job loss because it
is difficult to derive meaningful comparisons in the smaller sample of female lay-
offs as, once we create sub-groups, the estimates are imprecise. Since the worker
characteristics are correlated with one another, we estimate models in which all co-
efficients in the equation (2) are interacted with third-order polynomial controls on
other individual-level characteristics.
The first striking pattern in Figure 7 is that DV following male job loss is re-
markably pervasive, being evident across the entire distributions of age, income and
education. While there is a positive association between poverty and DV, the im-
pact of male job loss on DV is not larger in households that have lower income at
baseline. In Appendix Figure B7, we also show that the effect is pervasive across a
range of area-level characteristics – including baseline DV levels, the gender pay gap,
informality rates and GDP per capita, despite the vast heterogeneity across Brazilian
regions. In addition, we show that the impact does not strongly vary with the number
of displaced co-workers in the same mass layoff, suggesting that mass layoff effects are
not a special case in comparison to regular layoffs. This is in line with the evidence
in Appendix Tables B4, Panel D, showing similar impacts when using plant closures.
To provide evidence on the income mechanism, we compare workers displaced with
different tenure, exploiting the fact that severance pay is increasing in tenure. We
compare workers displaced with 3 or more years in the job – who receive on average of
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7 months wages in severance pay – to those displaced with 6-36 months tenure – who
receive on average less than 2 months wages.17 The left panel in Figure 8 shows (on the
right vertical axis) large differences in access to liquidity on account of severance pay
between the two tenure groups, which have similar access to unemployment benefits.18
The same figure shows that job loss raises DV for workers with 6-36 months tenure
but that it has no impact on DV among high tenure workers, suggesting that liquidity
at displacement may be a mechanism driving DV. This pattern is displayed again in
the right panel of Figure 8 which shows dynamic effects by tenure.
Differential effects by tenure are not capturing differential effects by age, educa-
tion, or income, as our specification controls flexibly for gradients in these character-
istics. Indeed, the left panel of Figure 8 shows that estimated effects by tenure are
very similar when we control for interactions of job loss with these worker characteris-
tics. Robustness of the coefficients to controls for observables makes it less likely that
unobservables correlated with tenure drive our results. The null effect on DV among
high-tenure workers is also not a result of these workers finding work more readily
than low tenure workers, see the centre panel of Figure 8 which shows that impacts
of job loss on months worked do not vary significantly by tenure. This also rules out
time availability (or opportunities for violence on the part of men) as an explanation
of the tenure gradient. The most likely explanation is that tenure proxies liquidity
at displacement, and that liquidity ameliorates the impact of job loss on DV. That
low-tenure workers in Brazil face tighter liquidity constraints than high-tenure work-
ers is consistent with evidence from Brazil that consumption losses following layoff
are decreasing in tenure (Gerard and Naritomi, 2021) and that job search is sensitive
to cash on hand only among low-tenure workers (Britto, 2020). In the next section,
we bolster this evidence on mechanisms using quasi-experimental variation in access
to unemployment benefits.
17We exclude workers displaced with less than 6 months in the job who are not eligible for UI, so
that our comparison captures differences in severance pay rather than unemployment benefits. We
analyse UI impacts in Section 5.
18We refer to severance pay as the total amount received from the mandatory savings account
and the indemnity paid by the employer upon displacement (see Section 2.) Although these sums
do not show directly in the data, they are estimated based on tenure and earnings.
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5 Do Unemployment Benefits Mitigate Impacts of Job Loss
on Domestic Violence?
We now investigate whether unemployment benefits mitigate the impact of male job
loss on DV.19 As already discussed, job loss delivers a negative income shock, but
increases potential time with the partner, implying a higher exposure to DV risk.
Unemployment benefits mitigate the income shock, but they may increase exposure
to DV risk (through increased unemployment duration), so the overall effect is a priori
ambiguous.
5.1 Research Design
Brazilian formal sector workers dismissed without a just cause are eligible for UI
benefits as long as they have been in continuous employment for at least 6 months
before layoff. The maximum benefit duration ranges from 3 to 5 months. For repeat
claimants, at least 16 months must have elapsed since their last layoff resulting in a
benefit claim. We exploit eligibility rules by retaining workers with at least 6 months
tenure and implementing a regression discontinuity (RD) design at the 16-month
eligibility cutoff for repeat claimants.20 We compare the behavior of workers who are
barely eligible and ineligible as follows:
Yi = α + βDi + f(Xi) + εi, (3)
where Yi is an outcome for i-th worker; Xi is time elapsed since the previous layoff
resulting in a UI claim (the running variable), standardized so that X = 0 at 16
months, the eligibility threshold; f(.) is a flexible polynomial with varying coefficients
on each side of the cutoff; and Di is an indicator for eligibility (i.e. D = 1(Xi ≥ 0)).
The coefficient β in equation (3) estimates the effect of UI eligibility, or equivalently,
the intention-to-treat effect of UI claims. We use data on UI payments to quantify
the share of workers taking UI benefits, their total amount and duration. The main
19We focus on males because the number of females workers is too small in the RD analysis,
leading to imprecise estimates (i.e., statistically indistinguishable from zero without being precisely
estimated zeros).
20We cannot exploit the 6 month cutoff rule because there is evidence of manipulation around this
cutoff. We use data on UI payments to restrict the sample to workers who exhausted all months
of UI benefits following the initial displacement. This makes the first-stage around the 16-months
cutoff stronger, since workers who did not use the 5 months can claim unused benefits when they
do not meet the 16-month requirement.
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estimates are based on a local linear model with a narrow bandwidth of 45 days, but
we check the sensitivity of our results to a range of bandwidths (including the optimal
bandwidth of Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014) and polynomial specifications.
We will also perform permutation tests, comparing our estimate at the true cutoff
with a distribution of estimates at placebo cutoffs.
5.2 Data and Balance Tests
In order to increase statistical power of the RD analysis, the sample includes all
workers who have unique names in the state (about 70% of the universe of workers),
rather than only workers with a unique name in the entire country as in the analysis
of job loss (about 50% of the universe).21 We restrict attention to workers displaced
during 2009-14 because numerous changes to UI were implemented in 2015. Cyclical
peaks in layoffs on the first and last days of the month (see Appendix Figure C1)
generate discontinuities in the density of the running variable about every 30 days that
are not specific to the 16-month cutoff.22 In our baseline specification, we address
this issue by restricting the sample to workers initially dismissed between the 3rd
and 27th of the month, so that the 16-month cutoff date does not overlap with the
monthly dismissal cycles. Importantly, this restriction is based on the initial layoff
date which determines the RD cutoff, and not the current layoff date determining the
running variable. Figure C2 shows no evidence of density discontinuity around the
16-month cutoff in this restricted sample, as also confirmed by the McCrary density
test (McCrary, 2008) and the bias-robust test developed in Cattaneo, Jansson and
Ma (2018, 2020). In addition, Figure C3 in the Appendix shows that a rich set of
pre-determined worker characteristics are balanced at the cutoff; most importantly,
there are no significant differences in DV prosecution rates before displacement (Table
3, Panel C). Overall, these results provide compelling evidence that displaced workers
are as good as randomly assigned near the cutoff. In any event, we show in Appendix
21Accordingly, we match the employment and judicial registers based on name and the state where
the worker and the court are located. Panel B of Table B4 showed robustness of the main results to
using the state level restriction.
22Workers who are initially displaced close to the last day of the month are more likely to be
dismissed again on the last day of any month (including the 16-month eligibility cutoff). For instance,
a worker dismissed on January 1st 2010 will be able to claim benefits again if dismissed from April
30st 2011. Given the dismissal cycle, when re-employed, s/he will be more likely to be displaced on
the last day of the month – April 30st 2011 – rather than during the days immediately before, which
creates a mild discontinuity in the density function. However, this discontinuity is not specific to
the 16-month period that is relevant for UI eligibility.
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C.2 that our main findings remain robust when including workers dismissed on all
dates and adding fixed effects for individual-specific cutoff and dismissal dates to
control for dismissal cycles. In this specification, the estimates rely upon variation in
worker-specific dismissal dates within groups who have the same cutoff date.
5.3 Results and robustness
Liquidity associated with UI eligibility is shown in the upper row of Figure 9. Workers
barely meeting the 16-month requirement receive roughly an additional R$2,000 in
the first semester after layoff (equivalent to 2.5 UI monthly payments, or 1.5 pre-
displacement monthly wages), and close to nothing in the second semester after layoff.
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 3, Panel A, quantify these effects; column (4) shows, in
addition, that the take up is equal to 57%.
We find that UI does not attenuate the increase in DV following job loss, and that
it in fact increases DV in the second semester after layoff, when benefit payments
cease, see the center row in Figure 9. This is confirmed in Table 3, Panel B, which
shows a null effect in the first semester and a positive effect in the following semester.
In a three-year period, UI eligibility increases the probability of facing a DV lawsuit
by almost a third. The adverse impact on DV in the second semester is robust to
alternative bandwidths and polynomials in the running variable (Appendix Table
C1), to permutation tests where we compare our estimates to those at placebo cutoffs
(Appendix Figure C4) and to adjusting for cyclicality in hiring and firing (Appendix
Table C2). The impact on the overall DV probability up to 3 years after displacement
is less robust. We conclude that UI benefits fail to reduce DV and they may, in
fact, increase it after benefit expiration. This result contributes to research on the
unintended or behavioural impacts of unemployment benefits.
5.4 Discussion and mechanisms
Our finding that UI eligibility increases DV can be explained by the fact that displaced
male workers eligible for UI spend on average less time at work in the semesters after
layoff, compared to displaced workers that are non-eligible. This implies a potentially
longer time with their partners. The bottom row of Figure 9 and Panel D of Table
3 shows that eligible males work 8.6 weeks less in the 3 years after layoff, which is
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equivalent to a 11.5% reduction over the mean.23 That UI reduces labor supply is
in line with a large literature, see among others, Card, Chetty and Weber (2007);
Gerard and Gonzaga (2021); Katz and Meyer (1990); Lalive (2008).24
To bolster this argument, Figure 10 compares the dynamics of the effects of UI
eligibility on employment and DV suits. Eligibility reduces employment by 2.9 weeks
in the first semester after layoff, and the effect remains sizable in the second semester,
after which the employment gap between eligible and non-eligible workers narrows
considerably. Turning to DV, the positive impact emerges in semester 2, when UI
benefits expire, and it vanishes in the third and fourth semester, when the employment
gap closes down. The null effect on DV in the first semester after displacement (during
which benefits are being paid) suggests that an income effect offsets the effect of
increased exposure on DV risk during this period, such that the exposure effect only
emerges after benefit expiration. This is consistent with evidence showing that UI
beneficiaries fail to smooth consumption, experiencing a sharp consumption drop
upon benefit expiration – see Gerard and Naritomi (2021) and Ganong and Noel
(2019) for evidence using Brazilian and US data, respectively). That income is a
mechanism for DV is line with the evidence in Section 4 showing no job loss effect on
DV for high tenure workers, who have great access to liquidity upon displacement.25
6 Conclusions
Domestic violence imposes substantial costs on women, society and the next gener-
ation. It creates anxiety, a loss of self-worth, physical and mental health problems
and lower productivity among women, and has further adverse consequences for their
children (Aizer, 2010, 2011; Currie, Mueller-Smith and Rossin-Slater, 2020; Carrell
and Hoekstra, 2010). Recent global estimates reveal that DV occurs on a very large
scale, and that it does not dissipate with economic development. It is therefore im-
portant to understand its causes, and we contribute in this paper to illuminating how
23We also check that reemployment wages are not affected by UI eligibility, in line with the findings
in Gerard and Gonzaga (2021) and Britto (2020).
24Unemployment benefits were not conditional on attendance of training programs or minimum
job search requirements in our analysis period. In 2012-14, there were attempts to condition benefits
on attendance of training programs (PRONATEC). However, data from the Ministry of Labor show
that only 1.2% of UI beneficiaries participated.
25Using a range of crimes, Britto, Pinotti and Sampaio (2020) and Rose (2018) find that UI
eligibility reduces crime, consistent with the income effect of UI overwhelming the exposure effect
of UI in their settings.
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DV evolves with a key economic shock experienced every year by millions of workers
worldwide: the loss of a job.
Our main finding is that male and female job loss lead to an escalation of domes-
tic violence. These results are consistent with DV increasing under income scarcity
and when families spend more time together during the stressful period of unemploy-
ment. This paper complements and extends a large literature studying the effects
of local economic shocks on domestic violence. These studies analyse relative varia-
tion in labor market conditions for men and women as influencing DV by affecting
their potential income and the balance of power within the household. In contrast,
our findings reveal the dramatic effects caused by actual job loss. Although only a
relatively small share of the total population suffers job loss in economic downturns,
this represents millions of individuals. For instance, the International Labour Or-
ganization estimates that 212 million workers worldwide were displaced during the
2008 financial crisis (ILO, 2010). Our results emphasize the need for interventions
supporting potential victims in households where either of the partners has lost a job.
A new and important insight of this paper is that the provision of unemployment
benefits, a natural policy response, can misfire if it generates behavioural responses
that lead men to remain unemployed for longer. This suggests that unemployment
benefits have a better chance of mitigating impacts of job loss on DV if accompanied
by policies including job placement or skills training that facilitate, incentivize or
mandate a return to work, differently from our setting, where benefits were uncondi-
tional.26
Finally, our findings on mechanisms line up well with the remarkable global surge
in domestic violence during the Covid-19 pandemic, as the latter is plausibly the
result of income losses brought by widespread job loss and lockdown policies which
reinforce the exposure effects of job loss.
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Figures
Figure 1: Trends in Femicide and The Employment Rate in Brazil
Notes The graph shows the evolution of the feminicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants (left vertical axis) and the
employment rate (right vertical axis) in Brazil over the 1990-2018 period.
Figure 2: Domestic violence by employment status, age and tenure
Notes The top graphs compare the yearly probability of DV perpetration in DV suits for men and DV victimization
in protective measures for women, comparing workers that are continuously employed to workers losing their job in
each year by age. The bottom graphs present the same measures for job losers one year after layoff. The distribution
of age and tenure are displayed in gray, right-axes.
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Figure 3: The effect of job loss on labor income
Notes This figure shows the effect of job loss on formal labor income by gender, as estimated from the difference-
in-differences equation (1) – along with 95% confidence intervals. The treatment group comprises workers displaced
in mass layoffs, while the control group is defined via matching among workers in non-mass layoff firms who are not
displaced in the same calendar year. All coefficients are rescaled by the average value of the outcome in the treated
group at t = 0, which is also reported. Years relative to layoff are defined relative to the exact date of layoff, i.e.,
t = 1 for the first 12 months after layoff, t = 2 for the following 12 months, and so on. Income variables are measured
in Brazilian Reais.
Figure 4: The effect of male and female job loss on domestic violence, judicial suits
Notes. This figure shows the effect of job loss on the probability of DV perpetration in DV suits for men and DV
victimization in protective measures for women, as estimated from the difference-in-differences equation (1) – along
with 95% confidence intervals. The treatment group comprises workers displaced in mass layoffs, while the control
group is defined via matching among workers in non-mass layoff firms who are not displaced in the same calendar
year. All coefficients are rescaled by the average value of the outcome in the treated group at t = 0, which is also
reported. Years relative to layoff are defined relative to the exact date of layoff, i.e., t = 1 for the first 12 months after
layoff, t = 2 for the following 12 months, and so on.
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Figure 5: The effect of male job loss on domestic violence by offense intensity
Notes. This figure shows the effect of male job loss on the probability of DV perpetration in DV suits by type and
maximum penalty in the four years after the layoff, as estimated from the difference-in-differences equation (2) – along
with 95% confidence intervals. The treatment group comprises workers displaced in mass layoffs, while the control
group is defined via matching among workers in non-mass layoff firms who are not displaced in the same calendar
year. The post-treatment coefficient is rescaled by the average value of the outcome in the treated group at t = 0.
Years relative to layoff are defined relative to the exact date of layoff, i.e., t = 1 for the first 12 months after layoff,
t = 2 for the following 12 months, and so on.
Figure 6: The effect of male and female job loss on domestic violence, health system DV
notifications
Notes. This figure shows the effect of job loss on the incidence of DV in SINAN reports – health system mandatory
notifications on DV victims – for displaced men’s female partners and displaced women, respectively, as estimated
from the difference-in-differences equation (1) – along with 95% confidence intervals. The treatment group comprises
workers displaced in mass layoffs, while the control group is defined via matching among workers in non-mass layoff
firms who are not displaced in the same calendar year. Years relative to layoff are defined relative to the exact date
of layoff, i.e., t = 1 for the first 12 months after layoff, t = 2 for the following 12 months, and so on.
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Figure 7: The effect of male job loss on domestic violence, judicial suits, by individual
characteristics
Notes. This figure shows the effect of male job loss on the probability of DV perpetration in DV suits in the four years
after layoff – along with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline follows the difference-in-differences equation (2), while
a second specification interacts all coefficients in the eq. with third-order polynomials on individual characteristics.
The treatment group comprises workers displaced in mass layoffs, while the control group is defined via matching
among workers in non-mass layoff firms who are not displaced in the same calendar year. All coefficients are rescaled
by the average value of the outcome in the treated group at t = 0, which is also reported. Years relative to layoff are
defined relative to the exact date of layoff, i.e., t = 1 for the first 12 months after layoff, t = 2 for the following 12
months, and so on.
Figure 8: The effect of male job loss on domestic violence by tenure
Notes. This figure shows: (i) the average effect of male job loss on probability of DV perpetration in DV suits by
tenure at displacement (left panel) and on months worked (center panel), as in eq. (2), and (ii) the dynamic effects
of male job loss on probability of DV perpetration in DV suits by tenure at displacement (right panel), as in eq. (1) –
along with 95% confidence intervals. The left and center panel report the total predicted lump-sum amount workers
receive upon displacement in severance payment and unemployment benefits in month wages- the liquidity scale is on
the right vertical axis . The treatment group comprises workers displaced in mass layoffs, while the control group is
defined via matching among workers in non-mass layoff firms who are not displaced in the same calendar year. All
coefficients are rescaled by the average value of the outcome in the treated group at t = 0, which is also reported.
Years relative to layoff are defined relative to the exact date of layoff, i.e., t = 1 for the first 12 months after layoff,
t = 2 for the following 12 months, and so on.
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Figure 9: The effect of UI eligibility, male workers
Notes: The graphs plots UI outcomes (top), the probability of DV perpetration in DV suits (center) and employment
outcomes (bottom) around the cutoff date for eligibility for unemployment benefits. The sample includes displaced
workers with at least 6 months of continuous employment prior to layoff. Dots represent averages based on 10-day
bins. The lines are based on a local linear polynomial smoothing with a 45-day bandwidth with 95% confidence
intervals. UI amounts in Brazilian reais.
Figure 10: The effect of UI eligibility on DV and Employment, male workers, RD
discontinuity estimates by period after the layoff
Notes: The graphs plots RD discontinuity estimates around the cutoff date for eligibility for unemployment benefits
on the probability of DV perpetration in DV suits and employment in semesters after layoff. The sample includes
displaced workers with at least 6 months of continuous employment prior to layoff. The RD estimates are based on a
local linear polynomial with a 45-day bandwidth and vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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Tables
Table 1: Treatment and control groups descriptive statistics, male and female job loss
Male Job Loss Female Job Loss
Treatment Control Std Diff Treatment Control Std Diff
Demographic characteristics
Years of education 10.0 10.9 0.33 11.5 11.7 0.06
Age 30.3 30.3 0.00 30.5 30.5 0.00
Race - white 41.8% 45.2% 0.07 46.6% 46.5% 0.00
Race - black 5.7% 5.3% - 0.02 3.1% 3.8% 0.04
Race - brown 43.8% 42.1% - 0.03 39.0% 40.7% 0.03
Job characteristics
Monthly income (R$) 1,438 1,445 0.01 1,063 1,075 0.02
Month of worked t− 1 10.7 11.2 0.17 11.2 11.5 0.09
Tenure on Jan 1st (years) 1.1 1.1 0.03 1.4 1.4 0.01
Manager 2.5% 4.8% 0.12 6.0% 7.2% 0.05
Firm size (employees) 724 600 - 0.07 667 560 -0.07
Local area - municipality
Large municipality - pop> 1M 42% 44% 0.04 37% 37% -0.02
Municipality population 2,601,919 2,696,668 0.02 990,340 976,942 -0.01
Homicide rate (per 100k inhab.) 32.8 31.6 - 0.06 40.8 38.2 -0.12
Domestic Violence
Prob. of DV prosecution or protective measure t− 1 0.0015 0.0011 - 0.01 - - -
Prob. of DV prosecution t− 1 0.0006 0.0005 - 0.01 - - -
Prob. of protective measure t− 1 0.0009 0.0006 - 0.01 0.0007 0.0007 0.00
Observations 810,926 810,926 90,940 90,940
Notes: This table reports by gender the average characteristics for treated workers displaced in mass layoffs,
respectively (columns 1 and 4); for matched control workers who are not displaced in the same calendar year
(columns 2 and 5); and the standardized difference between the two groups (columns 3 and 6).
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Table 2: Effect of job loss on labor market outcomes and domestic violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Labor market effects Probability of DV
Dependent variable: Employment Income Any DV Prosecution Protective Measure
PANEL A: MALES DISPLACED IN MASS LAYOFFS, DV PERPETRATION
Effect of job loss -0.22*** -6187.2*** 0.00048*** 0.00025*** 0.00028***
(0.002) (72.5) (0.00008) (0.00005) (0.00006)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 1 14,674 0.0015 0.0006 0.0009
Effect relative to the mean -22% -42% 32% 40% 30%
Elasticity to earnings -0.77 -0.95 -0.70
Observations 11,352,964 11,352,964 11,352,964 11,352,964 11,352,964
PANEL B: FEMALES DISPLACED IN MASS LAYOFFS, DV VICTIMIZATION
Effect of job loss -0.23*** -4440.5*** - - 0.00040***
(0.004) (68.6) - - (0.0001)
-
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 1 11,193 - - 0.0007
Effect relative to the mean -23% -40% - - 56%
Elasticity to earnings - - -1.41
Observations 1,273,160 1,273,160 - - 1,273,160
Notes: This table shows the effect of job loss on labor market outcomes (columns 1-2) and DV perpetra-
tion/victimization outcomes (columns 3-6), for males in Panel A and females in Panel B, as estimated from
the difference-in-differences equation (2). The dependent variable is indicated on top of each column. The ex-
planatory variable of main interest is a dummy Treati that is equal to 1 for displaced workers, interacted with
a dummy Postt equal to 1 for the period after displacement. The sample includes workers displaced in mass
layoffs who are matched to control workers employed in non-mass layoff firms, who are not displaced in the same
calendar year. All regressions include on the right-hand side Treati and a full set of year fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the firm level are displayed in parentheses (*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1).
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Table 3: Effect of UI eligibility, male workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: UI payments
Semester 1 Semester 2 Payments Take up
Eligibility for UI benefits 1950.5*** 121.0*** 2.55*** 0.57***
(18) (4) (0.02) (0.005)
Mean outcome at the cutoff 83.7 3.8 0.1 0.0
Effect relative to the mean - - - -
Observations 98,167 98,167 98,167 98,167
PANEL B: DV - after layoff
Semester 1 Semester 2 Semester 3 Up to Year 3
Eligibility for UI benefits 0.0002 0.0008** 0.0002 0.0015*
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0009)
Mean outcome at the cutoff 0.0008 0.0006 0.0009 0.0047
Effect relative to the mean 23.7% 124.4% 21.5% 31.6%
Observations 98,167 98,167 98,167 98,167
PANEL C: DV - before layoff - placebo
Semester 1 Semester 2 Semester 3 Up to Year 3
Eligibility for UI benefits 0.0001 0.000 -0.0002 -0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Mean outcome at the cutoff 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Effect relative to the mean 16.1% 0.0% -39.2% -23.3%
Observations 98,167 98,167 98,167 98,167
PANEL D: Employment Weeks worked
Semester 1 Semester 2 Semester 3 Up to Year 3
Eligibility for UI benefits -2.97*** -2.16*** -1.03*** -8.63***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.7)
Mean outcome at the cutoff 8.3 13.4 13.5 75.2
Effect relative to the mean -35.8% -16.1% -7.6% -11.5%
Observations 98,167 98,167 98,167 98,167
Notes: This table shows the effect of unemployment insurance (UI) eligibility on UI outcomes (Panel A), the
probability of DV perpetration after and before layoff (Panel B and C) and employment outcomes (Panel D), as
estimated from equation (3) using a Regression Discontinuity Design. Semesters are set relative to the layoff date.
The sample includes displaced workers with at least 6 months of continuous employment prior to layoff who are
displaced within a symmetric bandwidth of 45 days around the cutoff required for eligibility for unemployment
benefits – namely, 16 months since the previous layoff resulting in UI claims. The local linear regression includes
a dummy for eligibility for UI benefits (i.e., the variable of main interest), time since the cutoff date for eligibility,
and the interaction between the two. The table also reports the baseline mean outcome at the cutoff and the
percentage effect relative to the baseline mean. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and displayed
in parentheses (*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1).
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A Appendix to Section 3
Table A1: Descriptive statistics by name uniqueness
Male Female
Unique Others Std Diff Unique Others Std Diff
Demographic characteristics
Years of education 10.7 10.2 - 0.21 11.7 11.3 -0.19
Age 30.8 32.0 0.15 30.7 31.0 0.03
Race - white 51.7% 45.7% - 0.12 60.0% 53.4% -0.13
Race - black 4.9% 6.6% 0.07 3.6% 5.2% 0.08
Race - brown 34.7% 39.2% 0.09 28.4% 33.5% 0.11
Job characteristics
Monthly income (R$) 1,697 1,538 - 0.07 1,362 1,182 -0.11
Month of worked t− 1 5.1 5.1 - 0.01 5.3 5.3 0.00
Tenure on Jan 1st (years) 1.7 1.7 - 0.00 1.9 1.8 -0.02
Manager 5.9% 3.5% - 0.11 9.7% 6.4% -0.12
Firm size (employees) 501 509 0.01 447 472 0.02
Local area - municipality
Large municipality - pop> 1M 34% 35% 0.02 35% 37% 0.04
Municipality population 1,898,158 2,067,751 0.05 2,116,420 2,350,872 0.06
Homicide rate (per 100k inhab.) 29.7 30.4 0.03 27.4 28.2 0.04
Observations 6,283,650 6,615,024 4,426,710 2,889,899
Notes: The table reports the average characteristics of displaced workers with or without a unique name in the
country, and the standardized difference between the two groups, by gender.
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B Appendix to Section 4
B.1 The effect of job loss on employment outcomes
Figure B1: The effect of job loss on employment outcomes
Notes. This figure shows the effect of job loss on formal employment outcomes by gender, as estimated from the
difference-in-differences equation (1) – along with 95% confidence intervals. The treatment group comprises workers
displaced in mass layoffs, while the control group is defined via matching among workers in non-mass layoff firms who
are not displaced in the same calendar year. Except for job turnover, all coefficients are rescaled by the average value
of the outcome in the treated group at t = 0, which is also reported. Years relative to layoff are defined relative to
the exact date of layoff, i.e., t = 1 for the first 12 months after layoff, t = 2 for the following 12 months, and so on.
Employment is measured at the end of each period, while job turnover indicates the activation or termination of a
job spell. Income variables are measured in Brazilian Reais.
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B.2 The effect of job loss on employment outcomes: informal work
If displaced workers return to jobs in the informal sector then our main estimates us-
ing data on formal jobs will overstate the drop in employment and earnings following
layoff. To investigate this, we repeated the analysis using the National Longitu-
dinal Household Survey (PNAD), which contains information on both formal and
informal sector employment and income. PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de
Domićılios) is the largest Brazilian household data and is a reliable source of data
on informal employment, being conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography
and Statistics (IBGE) which has considerable experience on generating statistics on
the informal sector. The microdata do not contain a person ID but we can track
individuals over time through five consecutive quarters based on their household ID
and characteristics, including gender, precise birth date and their order in the family.
We focus on workers who were initially interviewed during 2012-2014, and compare
those who were formally employed in the first but not in the second quarter (treated)
with a control group who were employed in both the first and second quarter (but
possibly displaced in later quarters).
The results are in Figure B2. Accounting for informal sector income reduces our
estimate of earnings losses in the first year after job loss by about 12% for male and
8% for female workers.
Figure B2: The effect of job loss on formal and informal labor income
Notes: This figure shows the effect of job loss on formal and informal monthly labor earnings (along with 95% confi-
dence intervals) by gender as estimated from the difference-in-differences equation (1), based on PNAD longitudinal
household survey data following workers for up to five quarterly interviews. The sample covers individuals first in-
terviewed in the period 2012-14. The treatment group is defined by workers who are formally employed in the first
interview and out of employment in the second interview; the control group is composed by workers who are formally
employed on the first and second interviews. Earnings are measured in Brazilian Reais. Baseline average values for
the treated group at t = 0 are also reported.
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B.3 The effect of job loss on domestic violence: comparable sample
Table B1: Effect of job loss on domestic violence, comparable sample, same jurisdictions
(1) (2) (3)
Labor market effects Probability of DV
Dependent variable: Employment Income Protective Measure
PANEL A: MALES DISPLACED IN MASS LAYOFFS, DV PERPETRATION
Effect of job loss -0.23*** -5423.3*** 0.00044***
(0.004) (88.3) (0.0001)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 1 12,996 0.0006
Effect relative to the mean -23% -42% 74%
Elasticity to earnings -1.77
Observations 3,431,680 3,431,680 3,431,680
PANEL B: FEMALES DISPLACED IN MASS LAYOFFS, DV VICTIMIZATION
Effect of job loss -0.23*** -4445.3*** 0.00040***
(0.004) (69) (0.0001)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 1 11,204 0.0007
Effect relative to the mean -23% -40% 56%
Elasticity to earnings -1.40
Observations 1,266,034 1,266,034 1,266,034
Notes: This table shows the effect of job loss on labor market outcomes (columns 1-2) and DV perpetra-
tion/victimization outcomes (columns 3) using a comparable sample covering the same jurisdictions for male
and female displacement, as estimated from the difference-in-differences equation (2). The dependent variable is
indicated on top of each column. The explanatory variable of main interest is a dummy Treati that is equal to 1
for displaced workers, interacted with a dummy Postt equal to 1 for the period after displacement. The sample
includes workers displaced in mass layoffs who are matched to control workers employed in non-mass layoff firms,
who are not displaced in the same calendar year. All regressions include on the right-hand side Treati and a full
set of year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are displayed in parentheses (*** p≤0.01, **
p≤0.05, * p≤0.1).
B.4 The effect of job loss on domestic violence: persistence
To investigate the observed persistence, we re-estimate the equation distinguishing
the first registered DV case for an individual from repeated cases, see Figure B3.
The results show that about half of the (absolute) male job loss effect is driven by
first offenses, while the other half is related to repeated offenses. The sustained
effect on first offenses is consistent with the sustained labor market losses following
displacement. Similarly, female job loss increases DV victimization in non-repeated
cases several years after job loss. Unlike in the case of male layoff, impacts on repeated
victimization are muted, but this pattern may in part derive from the fact that missing
names in the court data are more frequent for victims, so that we may fail to identify
repeated reporting.
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Figure B3: The effect of male and female job loss on domestic violence - persistence
Notes. This figure shows the effect of job loss on the probability of DV prosecution for men and on the probability of
filing a DV Protective measure for women, as estimated from the difference-in-differences equation (1) – along with
95% confidence intervals. The treatment group comprises workers displaced in mass layoffs, while the control group
is defined via matching among workers in non-mass layoff firms who are not displaced in the same calendar year. All
coefficients are rescaled by the average value of the outcome in the treated group at t = 0, which is also reported.
Years relative to layoff are defined relative to the exact date of layoff, i.e., t = 1 for the first 12 months after layoff,
t = 2 for the following 12 months, and so on.
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B.5 Reporting bias: Alternative measures of DV
B.5.A Arrests “in flagrante” and DV shelters
Figure B4: The effect of job loss on domestic violence - in flagrante arrests
Notes. This figure shows the effect of male job loss on probability of being prosecuted for DV following from an in
flagrante arrest, as estimated from the difference-in-differences equation (1) – along with 95% confidence intervals.
The treatment group comprises workers displaced in mass layoffs, while the control group is defined via matching
among workers in non-mass layoff firms who are not displaced in the same calendar year. All coefficients are rescaled
by the average value of the outcome in the treated group at t = 0, which is also reported. Years relative to layoff are
defined relative to the exact date of layoff, i.e., t = 1 for the first 12 months after layoff, t = 2 for the following 12
months, and so on.
Table B2: Effect of male and female job loss on domestic violence, use of DV shelters
(1) (2)
Job Loser Male Female
Dep. var.: DV Shelter Use DV Shelter Use
By Female Partner
Effect of Job Loss 0.00064** 0.00020***
(0.0003) (0.00006)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 0.0027 0.0004
Relative variation 24% 46%
Observations 460,152 1,476,852
Notes: This table shows the effect of job loss on the probability that women access DV public shelters, as
estimated from the difference-in-differences equation (2). In column 1, the sample is restricted to displaced
workers present in the social registry, for whom it is possible to identify the female partner. No such restriction
is necessary in column 2 as shelter use is reported by women. The dependent variable is measured at the end
of each calendar year and the sample is restricted to 2011-13, the period for which the outcome is available.
The explanatory variable of interest is a dummy Treati that is equal to 1 for displaced workers, interacted with
a dummy Postt equal to 1 for the period after displacement. The sample includes workers displaced in mass
layoffs who are matched to control workers employed in non-mass layoff firms, who are not displaced in the same
calendar year. All regressions include on the right-hand side Treati and a full set of year fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the firm level are displayed in parentheses (*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1).
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B.5.B DV notifications by the health system (SINAN data)
The key challenge in using the SINAN data is that unique individual identifiers are
not available. To address this challenge, we link job losers (and their matched control
workers) to health system DV notifications by clusters defined by the individual’s
exact birth date, gender and municipality. As these characteristics do not perfectly
identify individuals, this procedure generates some degree of measurement error in
the outcome variable. If we assume that measurement error is classical and exogenous
to the post-treatment variable of interest, this will cause our estimates to be more
imprecise but not biased.27 We assess this assumption by implementing the matching
procedure on employment outcomes, for which we do have individual identifiers. To
minimize measurement error, we restrict the sample to individuals in clusters with no
more than 80 people, which is equivalent to dropping the upper quintile of the cluster
size distribution.28 Appendix Figure B5 shows estimates of the impact of layoff on
employment outcomes estimated with the cluster-level match, compared with our
baseline estimates obtained with identified matches. Although the standard errors
are larger using the cluster-level match, the estimates are statistically significant and
similar in magnitude to the baseline estimates. This evidence supports our merging
procedure.
The data are effectively available from 2010 to 2017. We drop observations for
2009, the implementation year of these reports, because coverage around the country
was limited. The analysis of male job loss is restricted to the subsample of individuals
observed in the social registry in 2011, for whom we can identify their cohabiting
female partner and track them in SINAN – which covers information on the victims
but does not identify the perpetrator. We drop cases for which the aggressor is
identified as a relative (e.g., the victim’s father or mother), while we keep cases for
which the relationship with the aggressor is not reported (10% of all cases) so that
our measure is not endogenous to the victim’s willingness to identify the perpetrator.
The results are presented in Figure 6 in the main text.
27This situation is different from classical measurement error in a regressor, which leads to atten-
uation bias.
28Cluster size is measured by the number of individuals with the same birth date, municipality
and gender observed in the labor and social registry data.
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Figure B5: Robustness of merging procedure based on municipality-gender-birth date
Notes. This figure shows the effect of male and female job loss on the incidence on employment outcomes, respectively,
as estimated from the difference-in-differences equation (1) – along with 95% confidence intervals, which are too small
to be visible in some specifications. It compares the results when we merge outcomes at the individual level and when
do so based on clusters at the municipality-gender-birth date level. The treatment group comprises workers displaced
in mass layoffs, while the control group is defined via matching among workers in non-mass layoff firms who are not
displaced in the same calendar year. Years relative to layoff are defined relative to the exact date of layoff, i.e., t = 1
for the first 12 months after layoff, t = 2 for the following 12 months, and so on.
B.6 The effect of job loss on DV: Robustness
B.6.A Timing of violence: quarterly data
One concern regarding our main specification is that we measure violence timing based
on when DV suits are filed rather than when the violence occurs. For instance, we
could fail to detect diverging pre-trends in our analysis because of this lag. To address
this concern in the male job loss analysis, we focus on ‘in flagrante” cases, which offer
a timely measurement of DV since they are immediately filed in courts (see section
3). Our main results are confirmed using this measure, see Figure B4, Section B.5.A.
The female job loss analysis already relies on data on protective measures which are
immediately filed in courts. Our analysis using DV notifications by the health system
also overcomes these concerns since these data include the exact date when victims
seek medical assistance (see Section 4.4). Finally, we replicate the analysis based on
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Table B3: The effect of job loss on DV notifications in the SINAN data: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcome SINAN DV Report
PANEL A: MALE JOB LOSS, PROB. FEMALE PARTNER IN SINAN DV REPORT
Effect of job loss 0.0018** 0.0020** 0.0018** 0.0013 0.0016* 0.0026** 0.0019
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0, cluster size=1 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
Relative variation 102% 113% 102% 74% 91% 147% 107%
Observations 1,560,324 1,475,404 1,246,048 1,475,156 1,398,264 758,164 269,984
PANEL B: FEMALE JOB LOSS, PROB. FEMALE WORKER IN SINAN DV REPORT
Effect of job loss 0.00093** 0.00095** 0.00076** 0.00059* 0.00064* 0.00082 0.0013*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0, cluster size=1 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
Relative variation 36% 37% 30% 23% 25% 32% 51%
Observations 5,330,060 5,028,324 4,208,812 5,028,164 4,947,156 2,050,360 848,420
Max cluster size 120 80 50 80 80 80 80
Mass layoff definition 33% 33% 33% 33% 33% 50% 75%
Mun X Time FE Y
Mun X Birth Quadrimester X Time FE Y
Notes: This table shows the effect of female job loss on the incidence of DV in SINAN reports for displaced
men’s partners and women, respectively, as estimated from the difference-in-differences equation (2), for varying
specifications. In Panel A, the sample is restricted to displaced workers present in the social registry, for whom
it is possible to identify the female partner, while no such restriction is necessary in Panel B. The explanatory
variable of main interest is a dummy Treati that is equal to 1 for workers displaced upon mass layoffs, interacted
with a dummy Postt equal to 1 for the period after displacement. The control group includes workers employed
in non-mass layoff firms who are matched to treated workers on individual characteristics and are not displaced
in the same calendar year. The table also reports the baseline mean outcome in the pre-displacement year for
the treatment group – for individuals uniquely identified by the municipality-birth date – and the percent effect
relative to the baseline mean. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are displayed in parentheses (*** p≤0.01,
** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1).
”in flagrante” cases for men and protective measures for women at the quarterly level
which allows for a finer inspection of potentially diverging pre-trends. The results in
Figure B6 show are similar pattern to our baseline estimates and present no evidence
of diverging pre-trends.
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Figure B6: The effect of job loss on domestic violence, judicial suits, quarterly data
Notes. This figure shows the effect of job loss on the probability of DV perpetration in DV ”in flagrante” suits for
men and DV victimization in protective measures for women, as estimated from the difference-in-differences equation
(1) – along with 95% confidence intervals. The treatment group comprises workers displaced in mass layoffs, while
the control group is defined via matching among workers in non-mass layoff firms who are not displaced in the same
calendar year. All coefficients are rescaled by the average value of the outcome in the treated group at t = 0, which
is also reported. Time refer to calendar quarters relative to the layoff quarter.
B.6.B Municipality-industry-year fixed effects and enlarging the sample
to all workers with unique names in the state of work
In the main analysis, matched controls are defined on state, 1-digit industry, and
individual characteristics and this should difference out local shocks. Nevertheless,
we show that our results are not sensitive to controlling for a more granular set of
fixed effects, namely year × municipality×2-digit industry. We then show that our
results remain similar when enlarging the sample to cover all workers with unique
names in the state where they work – matching the employment data to judicial
records based on name and location, and improving the coverage of our data. Finally,
we also restrict the definition of potential (matched) controls to include only workers
remaining employed through the entire post-displacement period, rather than only in
the year that their treated match is dismissed. In all cases, our results remain similar,
see panels A-C of Table B4.
B.6.C Dynamic selection into layoffs
We demonstrate robustness to a series of tests for dynamic selection, that allay the
concern that displaced workers are selectively pre-disposed towards DV at the time
of displacement even within mass layoffs. We vary the definition of mass layoffs from
33% up to 75%, while jointly varying the minimum size of firms in the sample from
30 to 70. The larger the fraction of workers dismissed, the more limited is the scope
for selection into dismissal. Table B5 shows that the estimated effects of male and
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female job loss are broadly similar to the baseline estimates. Similarly, all results
hold when restricting the treated group to workers in closing plants (Panel D, Table
B4). The results are also robust to defining as treated all workers in mass layoff firms
at the beginning of the calendar year when the mass layoff occurs, rather than just
workers who are actually displaced. This approach avoids concerns regarding the
selection of workers dismissed from downsizing firms. As it delivers an intention-to-
treat estimate (analogous to estimates from randomized experiments with imperfect
compliance), the relative effect is smaller (21% rather than 32%) but it is still sta-
tistically significant (Panel E, Table B4). In both Panels D and E the estimated
elasticity of DV to earnings retains the same order of magnitude. We do not attach
a causal interpretation to these elasticities as that would require that layoffs affect
DV only through decreased earnings. In fact, layoffs can directly affect DV through
other mechanisms such as exposure.
B.6.D Missing data on names
We provide three robustness tests to address the fact that we cannot observe the
alleged offender’s identity in 40% of DV cases (prosecutions plus PM) and the victim’s
identity in 46% cases in our main analysis sample. First, we take advantage of the
fact that the share of court cases with missing identity varies widely across states and
jurisdictions, and show in Table B6 that our estimates are robust to progressively
dropping from the sample areas where the share of missing data is above a certain
level. In particular, our key findings hold when exclusively looking at areas where
missing data is not a substantial concern. Second, our findings on male job loss
hold when we restrict the sample to DV prosecutions initiated “in flagrante” (Figure
B4). In such cases, judges take the initial decision on case secrecy based on the
police form describing the arrest rather than by reference to defendant characteristics
such as employment status, so differential under-reporting should be a lesser concern.
Third, in Section 4.4 we show that the same key findings emerge when we analyze DV
SINAN-notifications on DV victims filed in the health system, an alternative measure
of domestic violence which is not subject to these missing data issues. Finally, we
show in Section 4.4 that our findings are robust to using another DV measure that is
independent of the court process.
B.6.E Estimation of dynamic treatment effects
Several recent studies highlight the challenges associated with estimating dynamic
treatment effects in two-way fixed effects settings when there is variation in the treat-
ment timing and treatment effects are heterogeneous across individuals. Under these
conditions, some treated individuals might enter the double differences estimating
the dynamic treatment effects with weights of opposite signs in different time peri-
ods. As a result, the estimated treatment effect differs from the average treatment
effect, nor it is representative of any relevant population of interest (de Chaisemartin
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and D’Haultfœuille, 2020).29 This problem is most severe when all or a large share
of individuals in the sample are treated at some point. We overcome these issues by
including a large share of never-treated workers. We estimate the share of units with
negative weights following de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2020), and find that
no individual treatment effect receives a negative weight both for male and female
job loss. It is worth noting that our difference-in-differences estimator is similar to
de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2020) with the difference that they select the
control group on a period by period basis to include all non-switchers while we fix
the control group over all periods.
29See also Goodman-Bacon (2021), Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), Sun and Abraham (2020), Athey
and Imbens (2018), Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020) and Imai and Kim (2021).
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Table B4: Effect of job loss on domestic violence, robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Job loser Male Female
Labor market effects Probability of DV Labor market effects Prob. of Filing
Dependent variable: Employment Income Any Employment Income Protective Measure
PANEL A: ADD MUN X IND X YEAR FE
Effect of job loss -0.21*** -5943.8*** 0.00041*** -0.21*** -4147.5*** 0.00039**
(0.002) (92.5) (0.00008) (0.003) (61.6) (0.0002)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 1 14,674 0.0015 1 11,193 0.0007
Effect relative to the mean -21% -41% 28% -21% -37% 55%
Elasticity to earnings -0.68 -1.47
Observations 11,313,141 11,313,141 11,313,141 1,252,986 1,252,986 1,252,986
PANEL B: ADD MUN X IND X YEAR FE, EXTENDED SAMPLE: UNIQUE NAMES WITHIN STATE
Effect of job loss -0.15*** -2114.7*** 0.00029*** -0.21*** -4076.4*** 0.00024*
(0.0008) (51.8) (0.00006) (0.003) (55.6) (0.0001)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 1 9,960 0.0014 1 11,050 0.0008
Effect relative to the mean -15% -21% 20% -21% -37% 30%
Elasticity to earnings -0.95 -0.82
Observations 16,679,411 16,679,411 16,679,411 1,668,366 1,668,366 1,668,366
PANEL C: ONLY CONTINUOSLY EMPLOYED IN THE CONTROL GROUP
Effect of job loss -0.42*** -10516.1*** 0.00071*** -0.45*** -7606.6*** 0.00057***
(0.002) (97.7) (0.00009) (0.005) (104.5) (0.0002)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 1 16,108 0.0016 1 11,193 0.0007
Effect relative to the mean -42% -65% 46% -45% -68% 80%
Elasticity to earnings -0.70 -1.17
Observations 4,911,578 4,911,578 4,911,578 572,922 572,922 572,922
PANEL D: ALL WORKERS IN CLOSING PLANTS
Effect of job loss -0.21*** -3535.5*** 0.00025** -0.29*** -3263.9*** 0.00023*
(0.004) (120.1) (0.0001) (0.004) (68.3) (0.0001)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 1 14,808 0.0010 1 9,338 0.0004
Effect relative to the mean -21% -24% 25% -29% -35% 66%
Elasticity to earnings -1.05 -1.87
Observations 1,381,136 1,381,136 1,381,136 598,374 598,374 598,374
PANEL E: ALL WORKERS IN MASS LAYOFF FIRMS
Effect of job loss -0.23*** -4131.2*** 0.00027*** -0.23*** -2893.7*** 0.00016*
(0.002) (73.3) (0.00006) (0.004) (69.4) (0.00009)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 1 13,068 0.0013 1 9,766 0.0005
Effect relative to the mean -23% -32% 21% -23% -30% 35%
Elasticity to earnings -0.65 -1.19
Observations 18,869,718 18,869,718 18,869,718 1,623,685 1,623,685 1,623,685
Notes: This table shows the effect of male (columns 1-3) and female (columns 4-6) job loss on labor market
outcomes and the probability of DV perpetration/victimization for different samples, as estimated from the
difference-in-differences equation (2). The explanatory variable of main interest is a dummy Treati that is equal
to 1 for treated workers, interacted with a dummy Postt equal to 1 for the period after displacement. Panel
A includes workers displaced in mass layoffs and adds interacted municipality-industry-year fixed effects, while
Panel B expands the sample to all workers with unique names in the state of work and Panel C restricts the
control group only to workers who are continuously employed throughout the post-treatment period. In Panel
D, the treatment group is restricted to closing plants. In Panel E, the treatment group is composed by displaced
and non-displaced workers employed in mass layoff firms at the beginning of the calendar year of the event. The
table also reports the baseline mean outcome for the treated group at the date of displacement; the percent effect
relative to the baseline mean; and the implied elasticity of crime to earnings, computed as the ratio between the
percent change in crime and the percent change in earnings. All regressions include on the right-hand side Treati
and a full set of year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are displayed in parentheses (***
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Table B5: Effect of job loss on domestic violence, robustness to mass layoffs definition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Job loser Male Female
Dependent variable: Minimum layoff share Minimum layoff share
Prob. of DV 33% 50% 75% 33% 50% 75%
PANEL A: MINIMUM FIRM SIZE 30
Effect of job loss 0.00048*** 0.00048*** 0.00045** 0.00040*** 0.00044** 0.00050*
(0.00008) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Relative Effect 32% 34% 29% 56% 120% 93%
Mean - Treatment Group 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 0.0007 0.0004 0.0005
Observations 11,352,964 5,226,816 1,936,536 1,273,160 532,266 233,366
PANEL B: MINIMUM FIRM SIZE 50
Effect of job loss 0.00050*** 0.00046*** 0.00044** 0.00040** 0.00047** 0.00064**
(0.00009) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Relative Effect 33% 32% 27% 64% 177% 142%
Mean - Treatment Group 0.0015 0.0014 0.0016 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004
Observations 9,555,448 4,493,944 1,651,160 946,708 421,428 186,760
PANEL C: MINIMUM FIRM SIZE 70
Effect of job loss 0.00053*** 0.00051*** 0.00051** 0.00037** 0.00041* 0.00057*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Relative Effect 34% 35% 31% 64% 154% 135%
Mean - Treatment Group 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004
Observations 8,502,466 4,053,056 1,492,386 793,282 366,870 166,390
Notes: This table shows the effect of male (columns 1-3) and female (columns 4-6) job loss on the probability of
DV perpetration/victimization for varying mass layoff definitions, as estimated from the difference-in-differences
equation (2). The explanatory variable of main interest is a dummy Treati that is equal to 1 for treated workers,
interacted with a dummy Postt equal to 1 for the period after displacement. The table also reports the baseline
mean outcome for the treated group at the date of displacement and the percent effect relative to the baseline
mean. All regressions include on the right-hand side Treati and a full set of year fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the firm level are displayed in parentheses (*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1).
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Table B6: Effect of job loss on domestic violence, robustness to missing values in the
judicial data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PANEL A: MALE JOB LOSS
Dependent var.: Prob. of DV Only states with a share of non-missing names in prosecution records above:
10% 20% 30% 50% 60% 70% 80% 85%
Effect of job loss 0.000480*** 0.000607*** 0.000598*** 0.000608*** 0.000609*** 0.000543*** 0.000463* 0.000497*
(0.0000788) (0.000118) (0.000129) (0.000133) (0.000157) (0.000145) (0.000255) (0.000291)
Mean outcome at t=-1 (treated) 0.0015 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0025 0.0011 0.0009 0.0005
Effect relative to the mean 32% 30% 29% 28% 24% 49% 52% 106%
Observations 11,352,964 7,452,536 6,740,468 6,534,304 5,213,936 2,859,430 1,035,216 744,282
PANEL B: FEMALE JOB LOSS
Dependent var.: Prob. of filing Only jurisdictions with a share of non-missing names in prosecution records above:
Protective Measure 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Effect of job loss 0.000397*** 0.000415*** 0.000526*** 0.000478*** 0.000504*** 0.000450*** 0.000558*** 0.0000713
(0.000137) (0.000144) (0.000174) (0.000139) (0.000145) (0.000149) (0.000193) (0.000268)
Mean outcome at t=-1 (treated) 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 0.0001
Effect relative to the mean 56% 55% 59% 73% 74% 63% 62% 61%
Observations 1,273,160 1,201,018 967,477 805,840 771,253 706,888 479,080 118,440
Notes: This table shows the effect of male (columns 1-3) and female (columns 4-6) job loss on the probability of
DV perpetration/victimization, as estimated from the difference-in-differences equation (2), while progressively
restricting the sample to states/jurisdictions in which the share of non-missing names in prosecution records is
above a certain threshold (indicated on top of each column). The explanatory variable of main interest is a
dummy Treati that is equal to 1 for workers displaced upon mass layoffs, interacted with a dummy Postt equal
to 1 for the period after displacement. The control group includes workers employed in non-mass layoff firms
who are matched to treated workers on individual characteristics and are not displaced in the same calendar
year. The table also reports the baseline mean outcome for the treated group at the date of displacement and
the percent effect relative to the baseline mean. All regressions include on the right-hand side Treati and a full
set of year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are displayed in parentheses (*** p≤0.01, **
p≤0.05, * p≤0.1).
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B.7 Estimates for Couples
We now show that our main findings hold within a sample of cohabiting couples. We
use the registry for Federal social programs (CadUnico) to identify the cohabiting
partners of job losers in our main sample. In just 3% of this sample, both spouses
lose their jobs in a mass layoff, and we drop these cases. Estimates on the remaining
sample for whom it is possible to identify a cohabiting spouse, using the same em-
pirical strategy (Section 4) are in Table B7. We find that male job loss results in a
77% increase in female partners filing protective measure requests (Panel A, column
1), and that female job loss increases the probability that male partners are judicially
charged for DV by 38% (Panel B, column 1). Baseline rates of DV of job loss are
larger in this poorer segment of the population, and differences in relative magnitudes
may reflect that it is a lower income population.
The household sample allows us to investigate heterogeneity in the impacts of job
loss by baseline household characteristics (Table B7, Columns 2-5). We find that
both male and female job loss have larger impacts on DV when there is a child under
the age of ten in the home, consistent with the income shock being more stressful in
young families with dependents. Male job loss has a larger impact on DV when the
female partner is not employed at baseline. This is consistent with both an income
mechanism – losses are stronger when the partner is not employed – and with an
exposure mechanism – partners spend more time together during the unemployment
period. Yet, these comparisons should be interpreted with caution as the sub-group
estimates are often not statistically significantly different from one another.
Finally, we investigate couple stability for job losers who continue to show in
the social registry in the post displacement period, see Table B7. Interpreting these
estimates required some caution as the probability of continuing in the social registry
increases after job loss, albeit this is arguably a small effect, ranging from 3% to 5%
relative to the baseline (column 6). We find that job loss does not strongly affect the
probability that job losers stay with the same partner after the layoff. Male job loss
does not affect the probability that men retain the same partner, while female job
loss reduces partner’s stability by 3% relative to the baseline (column 7).
.
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Table B7: Effect of male and female job loss on partners using household data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcome Domestic Violence In CadUnico Same Couple
Sample Youngest Child Youngest Child Partner Partner
All Age ≤ 10 Age > 10 Employed t = 0 Not Employed t = 0 All All
PANEL A: MALE JOB LOSS, PROB. FEMALE PARTNER FILES PROTECTIVE MEASURE
Effect of job loss 0.00050* 0.00068*** 0.00027 0.00029 0.00053* 0.043*** 0.0072
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.005) (0.005)
Mean outcome, treated at t=0 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0014 0.0005 0.8630 0.9048
Relative variation 77% 96% 47% 21% 103% 5% 1%
Observations 433,990 238,655 195,335 63,970 370,020 311,512 232,109
PANEL B: FEMALE JOB LOSS, PROB. MALE PARTNER PROSECUTED FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Effect of job loss 0.00092* 0.0016** 0.00029 0.0011 0.00082 0.030*** -0.026***
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.005) (0.005)
Mean outcome, treated at t=-1 0.0024 0.0026 0.0022 0.0023 0.0025 0.9657 0.7825
Relative variation 38% 61% 13% 49% 33% 3% -3%
Observations 236,280 116,435 119,845 88,700 147,580 183,540 158,851
Notes: Columns 1-5 in this table show the effect of male job loss on DV victimization by the partner (Panel A)
and the effect of female job loss on DV perpetration by the partner (Panel B), as estimated from the difference-
in-differences equation (2). In both panels, the sample is restricted to displaced workers present in the social
registry in 2011, for whom it is possible to identify the respective partner. Columns 6-7 presents the same results
on the prob. that the worker is still present in the registry after the job loss and, if registered, that she/he has
the same partner. The explanatory variable of main interest is a dummy Treati that is equal to 1 for displaced
workers, interacted with a dummy Postt equal to 1 for the period after displacement. The sample includes
workers displaced in mass layoffs who are matched to control workers employed in non-mass layoff firms, who
are not displaced in the same calendar year. All regressions include on the right-hand side Treati and a full set




Figure B7: The effect of male job loss on domestic violence, judicial suits, by area-level
characteristics
Notes. This figure shows the effect of male job loss on the probability of DV perpetration in DV suits in the four years
after layoff, by area-level characteristics – along with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline follows the difference-in-
differences equation (2), while a second specification interacts all coefficients in the eq. with third-order polynomials
on individual characteristics. The gender pay gap is computed at the microregion level in a regression with interacted
dummies controlling for hours, occupation, tenure and education. Layoff size indicates the number of displaced
individuals in the same mass layoff event. GDP, population and labor informality are based on 2010 pop. Census.
Employment growth rate in the worker occupation is computed at the yearly level based on RAIS. SINAN DV rate is
based on mandatory DV notifications by health providers. The treatment group comprises workers displaced in mass
layoffs, while the control group is defined via matching among workers in non-mass layoff firms who are not displaced
in the same calendar year. All coefficients are rescaled by the average value of the outcome in the treated group at
t = 0, which is also reported. Years relative to layoff are defined relative to the exact date of layoff, i.e., t = 1 for the
first 12 months after layoff, t = 2 for the following 12 months, and so on.
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C Appendix to Section 5
C.1 Dismissal cycles
Figure C1: The effect of UI eligibility, dismissal patterns, extended sample
Notes: The left graph presents the distribution of dismissal dates by calendar day within each month. The right
graph presents the running variable density function around the cutoff, based on an initial sample that includes all
dismissal dates.
Figure C2: The effect of UI eligibility, density around the cutoff, main sample, male
workers
Notes: This figure shows the density of dismissal dates around the cutoff date for eligibility for unemployment benefits
(i.e., 16 months since the previous layoff date in the past) in our main working sample. The sample includes displaced
workers with at least 6 months of continuous employment prior to layoff. The results of McCrary density test and
the bias robust test proposed by Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2018, 2020) are also reported.
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C.2 Robustness
Figure C3: The effect of UI eligibility, balance of covariates, male workers
Notes: The graphs show the balance of pre-determined covariates around the cutoff for UI eligibility. Dots represent
averages based on 10-day bins. The lines are based on a local linear polynomial smoothing with a 45-day bandwidth
with 95% confidence intervals.
Figure C4: The effect of UI eligibility on domestic violence, permutations tests, male
workers
Notes: The graphs compare discontinuity estimates of the effect of UI eligibility on the probability of DV perpetration
(vertical black line) with the distribution of estimates obtained at all possible placebo cutoffs within 180 days away
from the actual threshold, for different periods after layoff (indicated on top of each graph). The dashed lines
represent the 2.5, 5, 95 and 97.5 percentiles in the distribution of placebo cutoffs. Estimates are based on a local
linear polynomial smoothing with a 45-day bandwidth, as in eq. (3).
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Table C1: Effect of UI eligibility on domestic violence, male workers, robustness to
specification choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PANEL A: Dep. Var.: Probability of DV - semester 2 after layoff
eligibility for UI benefits 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0005 0.0008*** 0.0006** 0.0006* 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0006*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Mean outcome at the cutoff 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
Effect relative to the mean 93.3% 124.4% 77.8% 124.4% 93.3% 93.3% 155.5% 155.5% 93.3%
Observations 65,962 60,714 65,962 130,186 191,195 84,495 246,835 295,723 112,429
PANEL B: Probability of DV - up to 3 years after layoff
eligibility for UI benefits 0.0009* 0.0012** 0.0009 0.0012 0.0011* 0.0015* 0.0017** 0.0011 0.0017
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Mean outcome at the cutoff 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047
Effect relative to the mean 19.0% 25.3% 19.0% 25.3% 23.2% 31.6% 35.8% 23.2% 35.8%
Observations 65,962 60,457 65,962 130,186 191,195 117,016 246,835 295,723 117,618
Bandwidth (days) 30 CCT 30 60 90 CCT 120 150 CCT
Polynomial Order 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
Notes: This table shows the effect of eligibility for UI benefits, as estimated from equation (3), on the probability
of DV perpetration for varying specification choices. The sample includes displaced workers with at least 6 months
of continuous employment prior to layoff who are displaced within a symmetric bandwidth of 45 days around the
cutoff required for eligibility for unemployment benefits – namely, 16 months since the previous layoff resulting
in UI claims. The local linear regression includes a dummy for eligibility for UI benefits (i.e., the variable of main
interest), time since the cutoff date for eligibility, and the interaction between the two. Each panel estimates
separate regressions for the different groups, as indicated in their title. The table also reports the baseline mean
outcome at the cutoff and the percent effect relative to the baseline mean. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level and displayed in parentheses (*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1).
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Table C2: Effect of UI eligibility on domestic violence, male workers, robustness to
dismissal and cutoff fixed-effects and extended sample design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: Dep. Var.: Probability of DV - semester 2 after layoff
eligibility for UI benefits 0.00076** 0.00074** 0.00082** 0.00082** 0.00061** 0.00069**
(0.00032) (0.00034) (0.00032) (0.00034) (0.00028) (0.0003)
Mean outcome at the cutoff 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
Effect relative to the mean 118.2% 115.1% 127.5% 127.5% 100.8% 114.0%
Observations 98,167 98,165 98,157 98,155 136,364 136,353
PANEL B: Dep. Var.: Probability of DV - up to 3 years after layoff
eligibility for UI benefits 0.00153* 0.00142 0.00177** 0.00164* 0.00154** 0.00184**
(0.00085) (0.00087) (0.00086) (0.00088) (0.00071) (0.00074)
Mean outcome at the cutoff 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 0.0046 0.0046
Effect relative to the mean 32.3% 29.9% 37.3% 34.6% 33.2% 39.6%
Observations 98,167 98,165 98,157 98,155 136,364 136,353
Dismissal date FE X X X
Cutoff date FE X X X
Sample Main Main Main Main Extended Extended
Notes: This table shows the effect of eligibility for UI benefits, as estimated from equation (3), on the probability
of DV perpetration in DV suits for varying specifications and samples indicated in the bottom of the table. The
first four columns progressively include fixed effects for the individual-specific cutoff date and for each dismissal
date – defining the running variables – thus relying on variation in the worker-specific dismissal date within groups
who have the same cutoff date. In the last two columns, the sample is enlarged to include all workers who were
initially dismissed near the beginning and the end of calendar months, thus dropping the initial restriction in the
main sample. All regressions include displaced workers with at least 6 months of continuous employment prior
to layoff who are displaced within a symmetric bandwidth of 45 days around the cutoff required for eligibility
for unemployment benefits – namely, 16 months since the previous layoff resulting in UI claims. The local linear
regression includes a dummy for eligibility for UI benefits (i.e., the variable of main interest), time since the
cutoff date for eligibility, and the interaction between the two. Each panel estimates separate regressions for
different reference periods, as indicated in their title. The table also reports the baseline mean outcome at the
cutoff and the percent effect relative to the baseline mean. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level
and displayed in parentheses (*** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1).
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